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The aim of this dissertation is to explain the implications of systemic risk in the case of 
Portugal, specifically, the impact of a financial institution`s bankruptcy in the portuguese 
economy. Despite systemic risk exists before the global financial crisis, the extent of its 
negative effects during the recent crisis abruptly raised the interest of researchers. In 
the recent decades significant concerns about the stability of national and international 
financial systems have been raised. These concerns have been underlined by the current 
world financial crisis. With this work, I intend to highlight the effects of systemic risk in 
the different economic sectors. For this, autoregressive distributed lag regression 
methods were used. The results show a positive relationship between banks´ stock 
prices and non-financial companies stock prices meaning that the failure of a financial 
institution is likely to have serious repercussions in the financial system as a whole. In 
this dissertation, systemic risk is set as the main rationale to understand financial crisis, 
prudential supervision and as a key driver for crisis management.  
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Although systemic risk has been present before the burst of the recent global 
financial crisis, the extent of its negative effects raised the interest of many researchers 
in its origins and trying to find ways to mitigate it.  
Despite the diversity of studies in this theme, this work focuses on exploring the 
impact of systemic risk in the case of Portugal in the context of the recent financial crisis 
which began in 2007. 
The subject of the study includes possible forms of quantification and 
measurement of the effect of a bank failure in the rest of the market system. 
There is no point in talking about risk unless we mention returns. Returns are the 
prospective financial rewards relative to an investment. Furthermore, risk is the 
potential for unexpected fluctuations in returns, hence generating losses. Meaning that, 
investors should demand higher expected returns from riskier investments. In addition, 
a systemic problem is a phenomenon which is experienced by the whole group or 
system, such as economy, market or society and not just particular parts of it.  
Systemic risk is arguably the most important issue financial systems face today. 
Even though systemic risk events have been taking place for centuries, the financial 
industry and regulatory bodies have been focusing on these matters only since the 
Credit Crisis from 2007. Currency crises represent one of the oldest categories of 
systemic risk which dates to 1200s (Gottesman (12)). Therefore, systemic risk analysis is 
still in an early stage and there is as yet no single, universally accepted definition for this 
kind of risk. I present below some definitions which have been publicly communicated 
in recent years by well-known academics who focused on this theme: “Systemic risks 
are developments that threaten the stability of the financial system as a whole and 
consequently the broader economy, not just that of one or two institutions.” (Bernanke 
(5)); “A risk of disruption to financial services that (i) is caused by an impairment of all or 
parts of the financial system and (ii) has the potential to have serious negative 
consequences to the real economy. Fundamental to the definition is the notion of 
negative externalities from a disruption or failure in a financial institution, market or 
instrument.” (IMF, BIS, FSB 2009, p. 6). 
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Actually, these definitions have one common feature. They depict systemic risk 
caused by underlying risks to have the potential to severely impact the financial system 
as well as the real economy. This can be explained by the fact that large financial 
companies are closely interconnected and interdependent, meaning that the failure of 
one company can set off a chain reaction that jeopardizes the entire financial system, as 
happened in 2008. Note therefore, that according to De Bandt and Hartmann (7), 
systemic risk can be distinguished horizontally or vertically. The horizontal approach is 
limited to events in the financial system. In contrast, the vertical view focuses on 
systemic risk, which affects not only the financial system but also the real economy.  
In order to analyze systemic risk, we should understand another important 
concept, which is the contagion effect. Contagion, often synonymous with domino 
effect, can be defined as the probability that the instability of an institution will spread 
to other institutions, causing a system-wide crisis. The higher or lower interconnection 
between those institutions determines the transmission of shocks through different 
channels that causes the contagion effect. Some examples of contagion are the 
increased uncertainty in the financial system as well as an unsustainable increase in 
housing prices, causing a real estate market bubble. The banking sector is particularly 
sensitive to contagion (Swaga (32)). Given this, contagion is a mechanism of systemic risk 
through which it materializes and spreads in or outside the financial system. 
Systemic risk analysis has not yet evolved into a standard component of risk 
management as it comprises many different definitions, sources and impacts, as it 
develops quickly and can be unpredictable, making it a very complex and broad topic. 
Due to these challenges and considering the devastating impact of systemic events it is 
crucial to understand such risks and monitor them in order to protect the stability of 
financial markets. Multiple new regulatory bodies have been working hard in overseeing 
and enforcing new rules. Most of those rules are aimed at the banking sector, as it was 
widely affected. Taking all in consideration, financial institutions have demonstrated a 
commitment in better understanding, quantifying, monitoring and mitigating systemic 
risk. 
This thesis is organized in five sections. In Section two we considered the 
theoretical framework where we define systemic risk, we give an overview of the 
financial situation in Portugal and Europe over the times and we mention also the main 
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events which originated the financial crisis started in America. In Section three we 
present the literature review and we detail the main economic theories that attempt to 
explain systemic risk phenomenon. In Section four we characterize the data; we 
introduce and analyze the models and we explain the model used in the estimations 










2 Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Portugal and the Crisis 
According to the “Annual Report – The Portuguese Economy” (2014) from Banco 
de Portugal, the Portuguese financial crisis was preceded by a long period of strong 
economic growth together with credit expansion, like what happened with previous 
financial crisis. To understand the evolution of the economy and the origins of the 
financial crisis in Portugal we should consider two main factors. The first one is that the 
Portuguese economy is characterized by persistent structural weaknesses, namely, it 
has one of the lowest rates of education in EEC (European Economic Community), a 
peripheral geographical position in relation to the main European markets, and a 
productive structure based in low-value-added industries, which translates in low levels 
of productivity and consequently low economic growth, reflecting the lack of 
competitiveness. On the other hand, the European integration process, in the late 
1990s, led to many transformations and significant shocks. Among this major changes, 
stand out, in first place, the financial sector deregulation and the liberalization of the 
international capital movements; secondly, the accession to the European Monetary 
System and the decision to adopt the Euro; and thirdly, the privatization of big public 
companies (in a first moment, banks and insurance companies; in a second moment, 
energy sector, telecommunication and transport companies), partly driven by the need 
to reduce public debt in order to fulfil the euro zone membership criteria. As a result of 
some of these measures, real interest rates decreased significantly.  These 
developments were followed by a rapid catch-up of the Portuguese economy to the 
levels of EU average in the second half of the 1990s. However, they are closely related 
with the main economic weaknesses of the Portuguese economy at the present time. In 
fact, the sharp fall of the real interest rates combined with the massive inflows of foreign 
capital created inflationary pressures, on account of increased private and public 
demand, which affected the competitiveness of the traditional sectors of the 
Portuguese industry. In addition, it fostered the rising indebtedness of the various 
institutional sectors (corporations, households and the government). Moreover, the end 
of the nominal depreciation of escudo, due to the importance of exchange rate stability, 
has worsened this situation as it resulted in the reduction of Portuguese exports.  
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In contrast to what happened in the second half of the 1990s, a long period of 
mediocre growth verified from the turn of the millennium. This situation has been 
accompanied by the beginning of the Subprime Crisis, causing a financially unsustainable 
indebtedness.  
Consequently, Portugal agreed to an economic adjustment program which 
required to adopt austerity measures and to implement several structural reforms. The 
economic adjustment program focused in three main aspects: fiscal consolidation, 
mainly spending cuts and increasing revenues by adjusting value-added tax rates and 
raising fees for health care services, for example; financial stability that meant to reduce 
leverage and to strengthen regulatory supervision; and a structural transformation 
focused on reforming labor and products market and on improving the business 
environment, through jobs creation and increasing labor market flexibility. 
In the short-term, after the economic adjustment program implementation 
Portugal experienced a deepened recession, as showed by record unemployment rates 
and lower nominal wages, causing an increase in net emigration. In addition, there was 
a deeper than expected economic contraction. Despite that, the economic adjustment 
program ensured Portugal´s international reputation, crucial to guarantee a continued 
access to capital markets and to regain credibility. 
In parallel to this, as in United States, the Portuguese real estate market was 
significantly affected. 
In order to assess the impact of the crisis in the real estate market it is crucial to 
understand that home ownership levels are particularly high in Portugal and tend to 
raise in the future due to the fact that interest rates have been kept low over recent 
years and that the mortgage market has become increasingly competitive (Housing 
Conditions in Portugal, Matos 2009).  
The period that preceded the crisis was characterized by strong GDP growth 
explained by the uncontrolled expansion of the construction sector. In fact, the volume 
of real estate increased significantly in proportion to the demand. This speculative 
growth was stimulated by easily obtained credit. Banks provided loans and mortgages 
without control or safety and real estate was a source of investment with the intention 
to obtain large profits.  
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However, when other European countries were affected by the banking sector 
crisis as a result of having “toxic assets” the Portuguese banks were highly impacted and 
there was a decline in the value of the real estate assets they held. 
For this reason and because of the recession resulting from the economic 
adjustment program, wages and social benefits decreased, families lost purchasing 
power and showed difficulties in meeting their commitments with bank loans for 
housing. Some of them got into financial insolvency and lost the dwellings acquired. 
As consequence, the number of real estate transactions and mortgages declined. 
As if that wasn't enough, the construction sector was also severely impacted. In 
one hand, because of public spending cuts due to fiscal consolidation requirements, and 
on the other hand because of the real estate crisis and the difficulty to access to 
financing. According to “Associação dos Profissionais e Empresas de Mediação 
Imobiliária de Portugal” (APEMIP), national banks in 2014 were providing 5% of the 
credit that was granted to the real estate sector prior to the crisis. The number of new 
dwellings built fell from 114 000 in 2001 to 6785 in 2014 (European Construction Sector 
Observatory. Country Profile Portugal. March 2018). 
 
2.2 US Subprime Crisis 
When the United States Subprime Crisis burst in the summer of 2007, few 
predicted its effects would be felt so deeply and that it would turn lately into a 
widespread liquidity crisis of unthinkable proportions. 
The financial markets stress levels enhanced significantly in August 2007 when 
BNP Paribas was forced to halt redemptions on three of its investment funds with large 
exposures to securitization assets backed by U.S. subprime mortgages, which had 
become largely illiquid (Skidelsky (31)). 
This scenario worsened in March 2008 when Bear Sterns was rescued. Although, 
this indicator`s major increase was related to the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. breakdown on September 15, 2008, at that time the fourth largest U.S. 
investment bank.  
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The central cause of Lehman`s demise according to Wiggins, Piontek and Metrick 
(34) was its dependence on the subprime mortgage market. Prior to 2007, a rising in U.S. 
housing prices and the prevalence of low interest rates made real estate investments 
highly attractive. So, as other U.S. investment banks did, Lehman Brothers took 
advantage of that boom period and extended huge subprime mortgage loans. As a 
result, excessive borrowing triggered high degrees of leverage. In addition, short-term 
borrowings were an important source of funds. Indeed, sizable shares of their liabilities 
were overnight loans that needed to be rolled over each day. However, the unexpected 
happened and the real estate bubble deflated, so Lehman suffered large losses on real 
estate assets, which threatened its solvency. Confidence in the firm waned precipitating 
a liquidity crisis. Market participants started to question firms` solvency and viability, 
cutting off the firms` short-term funding. Lehman had almost no cash on Friday, 
September 12, and it was clear the firm would immediately default on obligations if it 
opened for business on September 15.  The scars of this last event continue to remain 
visible in the global financial system despite the remarkable strives to avoid its impact. 
The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy caused the collapse of several important financial 
institutions on both sides of the Atlantic. It marked the tipping point into a global 
financial crisis making it a source of systemic risk. Policymakers all over the world 
responded quickly, taking unprecedented actions to prevent the economic and financial 
crisis getting even worse. 
 
2.3 Madoff’s Pyramid 
As if it was not enough, a new scandal erupted on the late 2008, “Bernie” 
Madoff`s Ponzi Scheme. How does a Ponzi scheme work? A Ponzi scheme promises high 
rates of return with little risk to investors. It relies on a constant flow of new investments 
to continue to provide “returns” to old investors. In fact, the promoter solicits funds 
from new investors, but little or no investment occurs. What happens is that the 
promoter keeps almost all the money and pays “returns” to the older investors. Bernard 
L. Madoff carried out a 50 billion-dollar Ponzi scheme, keeping it for over 15 years in an 
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economic system which people thought was carefully controlled by regulations and 
supervised by various institutions.  
Madoff was seen as a reliable person. Investors trusted him because of his social 
status. He was a former non-executive chairman of NASDAQ stock market and founder 
of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, which was the sixth largest market 
maker on Wall Street back then. Given that, when Madoff was discovered he discredited 
even more the investment community, creating a portrait of billions of losses that 
corresponded to years of savings, which created a lot of uncertainty regarding the 
performance of the financial regulatory system. 
According to Rhee (28), this situation led the SEC (Securities and Exchange 
Commission) to enhance the financial due diligence by fund managers, institutional 
investors and other market participants and, that way, assess systemic risk, to increase 
the transparency of financial market in order to protect future investors. 
Taking this into account, we can conclude that big companies have the potential 
to fail just like small companies if the right structures are not put in place and 
implemented, contradicting the fact that there are “Too big to fail” companies, and that, 
actually, this events stimulated the need to implement more robust risk management 
systems. 
 
2.4 European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
According to Kräussl, Lehnert and Stefanova (21), despite the efforts to minimize 
the effects of the Financial Crisis in the European Union, it eventually brought the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis, with the collapse of Iceland`s banking system, which 
spread to Greece, Ireland and Portugal. The debt crisis led to a crisis of confidence for 
European businesses and economies. In this period of time, several European countries 
faced the collapse of financial institutions and most of them had a high level of 
government debt. Moreover, some European countries were unable to repay their 
government debt, or to bailout their banks without further external assistance 
(European Central Bank, International Monetary Fund or, European Financial Stability 
Facility, created, later on, in 2010). In the case of Greece, it was needed external 
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assistance since May 2010. Greece received several bailouts from EU and IMF, and 
adopted austerity measures, experiencing an economic recession. Ireland followed 
Greece, requiring a bailout in November 2010 and Portugal was next, in May 2011. In 
addition, Spain required official assistance in June 2012 along with Cyprus. The situation 
in most of these countries had improved due to fiscal reforms and domestic austerity 
measures. Though, recent Brexit movements created some instability in EU meaning 
that the road to full economic recovery seems to be long for now.  
The latest financial crisis reveals many weaknesses of bank risk modelling. The 
respective versions of the Basel Accords offer evolving risk models that attempt to 
resolve the problems of arbitrary model choices by banks, portfolio invariance issues, 
and the various treatment of banking and trading books. A challenge that still lies ahead 
for regulators is compensating for the drawbacks of the applied measures. A substantial 
challenge of the financial crisis for risk modeling is also the revealed fallacy of 
composition in banking, which highlights the need for risk modeling from a systemic 
point of view in addition to an individual bank’s perspective.  
Systemic risk models allow regulators to account for spillovers and correlated 
exposure among banks that can destabilize the whole banking system during times of 
market distress. The evolving risk measures and models are gradually being included in 
the banking regulatory frameworks. The challenge of adapting the regulations to 











3 Literature Review 
For several years now, there has been a lot of research in what concerns the main 
mechanisms behind systemic risk. Some authors dedicated themselves to develop 
important theories about the causes of systemic risk and, thus, how to avoid the 
contagion effect.  
Longstaff (22) reinforces the idea that there are at least three major channels by 
which contagion effects can be propagated through different financial markets. Those 
channels are correlated information channel, liquidity channel and risk-premium 
channel. The first one is related with the spread of news which apparently may seem 
irrelevant but can affect for example security prices in other markets or can be 
information about economic factors that also affects other markets. In addition, it can 
be to infer information from price changes in other markets. This channel impacts 
directly the prices, particularly if the market is more liquid than the market originally 
affected by the distress event. The second channel consists in a decrease of liquidity of 
all financial markets caused by a shock in a financial market. It is important to bear in 
mind that a distress event like this one may have a spiral effect meaning that it may be 
associated with a decline in credit availability and consequently with the increase of 
trading in other markets. The third channel is that a financial shock in one market may 
affect the willingness of market participants to bear risk in any market. Given this, prices 
can be affected as equilibrium risk premium adjust in return.  
Additionally, Allen and Gale (2) developed a theory on contagion, arguing that 
different sectors of the banking system have overlapping claims on one another through 
interbank markets. Moreover, when one sector suffers a banking crisis, the other sectors 
are affected negatively because their claims on the troubled region fall in value. If this 
spillover effect is sufficiently strong, crisis can occur in the adjacent sectors. In extreme 
cases, the crisis passes from sector to sector resulting in a contagion.  
De Bandt and Hartmann (7) also contributed to support the idea that we should 
look not only to the single banks` vulnerability but to the rapidly evolving financial 
institutions, which can be easily affected by contagion effect. It should be noticed that, 
in those times, way before the beginning of the financial crisis of 2007, the authors 
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emphasize the relevance of explaining and preventing real crisis, highlighting the issue 
of bank contagion. 
Benoit, Colliard, Hurlin and Pérignon (4) also referred the importance of 
information in the contagion effect. Indeed, if individuals believe that the failure of a 
bank is a signal that another bank can fail too, there is an informational link between 
these two banks and contagion can occur. Foucault (10) show that market illiquidity itself 
is contagious, so that a drop in liquidity for one asset can trigger a similar drop in other 
correlated assets, thus propagating problems. 
Furthermore, Rochet and Tirole (29) suggested possible ways to prevent systemic 
risk in a financial system. They stated that the “Too big to fail” (TBTF) policy has an 
important role in doing so. It is characterized by protecting uninsured depositors from 
large insolvent banks, whose failure could affect the financial system as a whole. They 
also said that another way to avoid systemic risk consists in centralizing a bank`s liquidity 
management.  
Hansen (13) distinguished systemic from systematic risk, stating that systematic 
risk has a universal recognized definition. Indeed, systematic risk can be denoted by 
market risk, meaning that it is the risk in the aggregate market that cannot be eliminated 
by diversification and that requires compensation. Contrarily, there is no consensus in 
what concerns systemic risk definition, although it is related with the risk of collapse of 
the entire financial system. Despite from that, this author also contributed, with his 
research, to find some of the greatest difficulties in measuring systemic risk. The main 
problem with systemic risk measurement is in quantifying systemic uncertainty. 
Uncertainty can be due to limited data, unknown models and misspecification of such 
models. Another important issue is that, as systemic risk does not have a single 
definition, there is no “perfect” model to measure it. Adding to this, it is of common 
sense that every model is limited as it simplifies and abstracts the information. For 
example, a model of financial networks is not an accurate measure of risk as it is difficult 
to make probabilistic assessments about more indirect linkages.  
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4 Empirical Descriptive Analysis 
4.1 Data Description 
The aim of this thesis is to identify and analyze the impact of systemic risk in 
Portugal, through an econometric model which allows to highlight the effect of a bank 
failure in the rest of the banking system and in other sectors, namely in the construction 
sector, in the electricity sector, in the telecommunications sector and in pulp and paper 
industry. The variables of most interest were selected to explain the dependent variable.  
To get to the final sample were used EViews 10 program and excel. These tools 
helped in the sample construction and to perform sample statistics and estimates. In 
addition, they allowed to build some graphs and tables to achieve the defined 
objectives. 
The graphs permitted to observe the evolution of the different variables and to 
understand how they relate. 
Thus, we obtained the best model which defines the risk that other economic 
agents may incur given a bankruptcy of one financial institution. 
4.1.1 Data Characterization 
As mentioned in point 4.1, the main purpose of this study is taken through a 
descriptive analysis and from model adjustment. In this regard, it was performed an 
analysis of three models in order to evaluate the impact of BES bankruptcy in the 
structure of other banks operating in Portugal, and four models were analyzed to 
measure the impact of the banking sector imbalance in other economic sectors. The 
sample period starts in December 2000 and ends in October 2014, whereas the total of 
observations is 3280. 
The analysis covered several economic and financial factors so that we attain the 
most realistic results possible. 
The data used in the estimation of the econometric models was the following: 
• Daily bank stock prices; 
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• Daily stock prices of four companies which were listed at the Top 5 
ranking of Portuguese biggest companies in the construction sector, 
electricity sector, telecommunications sector and pulp and paper sector, 
respectively, in 2014 (the year the BES bankruptcy took place); 
• Exchange Rate (EUR/USD); 
• 6-month Euribor rates; 
• Portuguese Gross Domestic Product. 
 











Souce: Investing.com & Bolsa PT 
As we can observe in Figure B.1, BES stock prices had a positive trend until 2007, 
when they attained its maximum value. This was followed by a sharp decrease and in 
2009/2010 there was a small recovery followed again by a drop until 2014, when it 
collapsed. 
BPI stock prices evolution was similar to that seen in BES, although it presented 
better values in the crisis period when compared to BES. The highest value was observed 
in 2007, before the burst of the Subprime Crisis. Then, there was a significant decrease 
in BPI stock prices, which in 2010 recovered and kept an equilibrium until 2017. 
The BCP stock prices decreased in 2002 and recovered right before 2007 when 






































































































































According to Figure B.2, Mota-Engil stock prices had a positive trend until 2007 
followed by a decrease still that year. There were two small recoveries, one in 2008 and 
one in 2009. After this second recovery, there was a decrease until 2011 and another 
price increase in 2012. 
It was found that EDP stock prices declined slightly until 2002, with an increase 
until 2007. In the beginning of 2008, a decrease was observed and the stock prices 
remained stable over time. 
NOS stock prices declined until 2001 and recovered until 2007, when they 
reduced significantly until 2012. 
The Navigator stock prices had the lowest price variation when compared with 
the other companies´ stock prices. There was a slight increase until 2007, followed by a 
price reduction until 2008 and a price increase until 2011. 
4.1.2 Variables Characterization 
Most of the variables mentioned above have a daily periodicity, however the 6-
month Euribor rate and the gross domestic product are defined on an annual basis. For 
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were obtained. In this regard, the linear interpolation method was adopted. This 
method consists in using linear polynomials1 to construct new data points within the 
range of a discrete set of known data points.   
In addition to these variables, a dummy variable was included in order to 
complement the model. The dummy variable is represented with 0 for all dates before 
“Banco Espírito Santo” bankruptcy and is represented with 1 for all dates after this date. 
4.2 Models 
The key variables in this analysis are daily stock prices of three of the biggest 
banks operating in Portugal and daily stock prices of four companies which were listed 
at the Top 5 ranking of Portuguese biggest companies in the construction sector, 
electricity sector, telecommunications sector and pulp and paper sector, respectively, in 
the year the BES bankruptcy took place, corresponding to the dependent variables. 
Given this, were gathered the variables which are included in the table B.1, Appendix B.  
Firstly, we considered to use multiple linear regression models. Given that, a 
logarithmic transformation of some variables, including both dependent and 
independent variables, was introduced in order to make the data more interpretable. 
The logarithmic transformation has also been used to help to meet the assumptions of 
inferential statistics. The logarithm function tends to squeeze together the larger values 
in the data set and stretches out the smaller values. This is useful in this analysis as the 
stock prices of “Banco Espírito Santo” immediately after the banks` bankruptcy had an 
almost residual value. Applying the logarithmic function to the daily stock prices of 
“Banco Espírito Santo”, allowed to increase the statistical significance of other variables 
to conform to the model.  
Note that, for BPI we did not apply a logarithmic transformation because it did 
not add information to the model (R squared was smaller and independent variables 
with a lower level of statistical significance). 
Consequently, it was assumed that the stock prices models may be described by 
the following equations: 
 
1 In table E.1 there is an example of this process. 
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Where BES, BCP and BPI correspond to the dependent variable, exchange rate 
corresponds to the EUR/USD exchange rate, GDP correspond to the portuguese gross 
domestic product and the residual variable is 𝜀𝑡. 
 In order to use a multiple linear regression model we need to guarantee 
homoscedasticity, through White-test, for example, and residuals autocorrelation 
absence, through Durbin-Watson test.   
The assumption of homoscedasticity is crucial to linear regression models and 
corresponds to equal levels of random disturbance between quantitative dependent 
variables across a range of independent variables. 
The Durbin-Watson Test is a measure of autocorrelation or serial correlation in 
residuals from a statistical regression analysis and reports a test statistic, with a value 
between 0 and 4, where 2 is no autocorrelation, from 0 to 2 is positive autocorrelation 
and from 2 to 4 is negative autocorrelation. 
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For instance, considering that the stock prices tend not to change significantly 
from one day to another, the prices from one day to the next day can be potentially 
highly correlated. 
Though, when analyzing the model, the homoscedasticity problem raised and we 
found out that the residuals were autocorrelated (Durbin-Watson test = 0.269), 
consequently, we concluded that the hypothesis of a multiple linear regression model 
estimated by the Ordinary Least Squares Method does not verify, therefore it is not 
possible to take feasible conclusions from this model estimation. 
For this reason, a more accurate alternative is to estimate Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ADL) models, because they take into consideration the application of 
lags to both dependent and independent variables which allows to measure the changes 
in the dependent variable based on current and lagged values of the explanatory 
variables. We will consider one to three lags in order to maintain the parsimonious 
principle.  
The parsimonious principle consists in using the simplest model possible with the 
least assumptions and variables but with greatest explanatory power to filter 
unnecessary aspects but without sacrificing comprehensiveness. 
4.3 Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
The autoregressive distributed lag model is applied for time series data in which 
a regression equation is used to predict current values of a dependent variable based on 
both the current values of an explanatory variable and the lagged (past period) values 
of that explanatory variable (Hassler and Wolters 2005).  
In time series models, in contrast to cross-sectional models, we must consider 
not only how much effect x has on y, but when the effect is felt. Therefore, the need to 
consider distributed lags arise when any economic cause produces its effects only after 
some lag in time, meaning that it´s effect is not felt at once at a single point in time but 
it is distributed over a period of time.   
The autoregressive distributed lag model is generally given by: 
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    (4) 
 
in which, for one-off unit change in 𝑥 there is an impact on 𝑦, this impact is captured by 
𝛽0. Then 𝛽1 is the impact on 𝑦 after one period, 𝛽2 is the impact on 𝑦 after two periods, 
and 𝛽𝑘 is the impact on 𝑦 after 𝑘 periods.  
If all the coefficients are collected: {𝛽0, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, ..., 𝛽𝑘}, they are called impulse response 
function of the mapping on 𝑥𝑡 to 𝑦𝑡. The above model is the lagged model accounting for 
the changes in {𝛽0, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, ..., 𝛽𝑘} on 𝑥 for lagged period 𝑡. On the y-axis, the y-dependent 
may response to exogeneous factors as well, thus, the ADL may accommodate for both 
𝑥 and 𝑦 as: 
 
  (5) 
 
The first order dynamic linear regressive model or ADL(1,1) may be used for 
short-run analysis and it is given by: 
 
  (6) 
 
In this short-run analysis, 𝑦𝑡 is stable and would converge to equilibrium with the 
condition: -1 < 𝛼1 <1.  
 
Thus, assuming that 𝑦𝑡  is stationary, that is, there is an equal effect of current 𝑥𝑡  
on future 𝑦𝑡+1  and of past 𝑥𝑡−1  on 𝑦𝑡 , and the autoregressive polynomial is invertible, 
meaning that it cannot be a zero polynomial,  and considering 𝐸(𝜀𝑡|𝑥𝑡) = 0 (excluding 










For the equations: 
𝑦𝑡  =  𝛼0  +  𝛼1𝑦𝑡−1  +  𝛽0𝑥𝑡  +  𝛽1𝑥𝑡−1  +  𝜀𝑡      (7) 
𝑦𝑡+1  =  𝛼0  +  𝛼1𝑦𝑡   +  𝛽0𝑥𝑡+1  +  𝛽1𝑥𝑡  +  𝜀𝑡+1      (8) 
𝑦𝑡+2  =  𝛼0  +  𝛼1𝑦𝑡+1 +  𝛽0𝑥𝑡+2  +  𝛽1𝑥𝑡+1  +  𝜀𝑡+2      (9) 
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=  𝛼1 . 𝛽0 + 𝛽1        
(dynamic marginal effect of x on y at one lag), considering that: 
 𝑦𝑡+1  =  𝛼0  +  𝛼1 (𝛼0  +  𝛼1𝑦𝑡−1  +  𝛽0𝑥𝑡  +  𝛽1𝑥𝑡−1  +  𝜀𝑡 ) +  𝛽0𝑥𝑡+1  +  𝛽1𝑥𝑡  +  𝜀𝑡+1 .          (11)     










=  𝛼1 (𝛼1 . 𝛽0 + 𝛽1)       













k−1 (𝛼1 . 𝛽0 + 𝛽1)    
 
Therefore, due to stationarity | 𝛼1| < 1, shocks have transitory effects: 
𝜕𝑦𝑡+𝑘
𝜕𝑥𝑡
→  0  as  k → ∞ 
For instance, if autocorrelation between 𝑦𝑡 and 𝑥𝑡 is strong, then a transitory effect will 
influence significantly the future periods, so it should not be considered in long-run 
analysis, but to account for short-run effects. 
To assess the ADL regression model, the stationarity of the dependent variable 
will be evaluated through a Dickey-Fuller test. If the dependent variable presents a unit 
root, then that variable can be modelled with first differences - lag(1). 
Unit root tests are tests for stationarity in a time series. A time series, in turn, has 
stationarity if a shift in time does not cause a change in the distribution´s shape.  
This assessment was made to the seven independent variables, BES, BPI, BCP, 
Mota-Engil, EDP, NOS and The Navigator and all these variables have a unit root2. 
 
2 As we can observe in tables C.1-C.7. 
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 Taking all into an account the stock prices models may be described by the 
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4.4 Model Analysis 
Building a model involves science, statistical methods and common sense, with 
the aim of finding the model which best explains the dependent variable. All the 
estimated models which are going to be analyzed at this point were performed with the 
help of EViews 10. 
It is important to mention that multiple simulations with multiple lags have been 
made but these are the models that best explain the dependent variables. 
When considering the seven ADL regression models, equations 7 to 13 we have 
checked that not all the variables are statistically significant. And, it is important to stress 
that the statistic tests were performed with a significance level of 0.05.  
The correlation between each of the companies´ stock prices and the banks´ 
stock prices vary (Tables A.3.1 and A.3.2). However, there is a strong correlation 
between the companies´ stock prices and BPI stock prices. This was because even after 
BES bankruptcy, BES stock prices were presented as being constant and BPI stock prices 
decreased as what we observe for the other institutions. Despite that, for NOS stock 
prices, the correlations with BES and BPI stock prices are very similar, 0.863 and 0.877, 
respectively.  In what refers to the The Navigator stock prices we realized that there was 
a negative correlation with BES and BCP. This is verified because The Navigator stock 
prices did not change substantially over time.  
 
Table A.3.1: Correlations Matrix 
 BES BPI BCP Exchange 
Rate 
Euribor GDP DUMMY 
BES 1       
BPI 0.8679 1      
BCP 0.7989 0.6604 1     
Exchange Rate 0.6443 0.4189 0.5792 1    
Euribor 0.6906 0.4564 0.7429 0.6835 1   
GDP -0.4855 -0.2235 -0.7290 -0.5286 -0.4217 1  
DUMMY -0.1254 -0.0432 -0.0874 -0.0658 -0.1259 0.04484 1 
Souce: PORDATA, Investing.com & Bolsa PT 
 
22 
Table A.3.2: Correlations Matrix 
 BES BPI BCP Mota-
Engil 
EDP NOS The 
Navigator 
BES 1       
BPI 0.868 1      
BCP 0.799 0.660 1     
Mota-Engil 0.445 0.717 0.181 1    
EDP 0.402 0.623 0.295 0.848 1   
NOS 0.863 0.877 0.616 0.550 0.448 1  
The Navigator -0.184 0.206 -0.342 0.681 0.612 0.064 1 
Souce: PORDATA, Investing.com & Bolsa PT 
 
One way of assessing the quality of the model adjustment is through the 
determination coefficient 𝑅2. This statistical measure determines the variability value of 
the dependent variable which is explained by the adjusted regression model, in other 
words it is a statistical measure of how close the data are to the fitted regression line. 
Thus, if the 𝑅2  of a model is 0.50 it means that approximately half of the observed 
variation can be explained by the model´s inputs. 
 
Table D.1: Results of the estimation of BES model 
Model 1 - BES    
Variables  Estimates Standard 
deviation 
P-Value 
𝐁𝐄𝐒𝒕−𝟏 0.994 0.001 0.000 
𝐁𝐂𝐏 0.044 0.014 0.002 
𝐁𝐂𝐏𝒕−𝟏 -0.045 0.014 0.002 
𝐁𝐏𝐈 0.217 0.047 0.000 
𝐁𝐏𝐈𝒕−𝟏 -0.197 0.047 0.000 
𝐄𝐱𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐞𝐑𝐚𝐭𝐞 -1.486 0.175 0.000 
𝐄𝐱𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐞𝐑𝐚𝐭𝐞𝒕−𝟏 1.469 0.174 0.000 
𝐄𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐨𝐫 0.003 0.003 0.336 
𝐆𝐃𝐏 -9.45e-07 2.70e-07 0.0005 











Table D.2: Results of the estimation of BCP model 
Model 2 - BCP    
Variables Estimates Standard 
deviation 
P-Value 
𝐁𝐂𝐏𝒕−𝟏 0.994 0.002 0.000 
𝐁𝐄𝐒 0.064 0.021 0.002 
𝐁𝐄𝐒𝒕−𝟏 -0.066 0.021 0.002 
𝐁𝐏𝐈 0.954 0.054 0.000 
𝐁𝐏𝐈𝒕−𝟏 -0.937 0.055 0.000 
𝐄𝐱𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐞𝐑𝐚𝐭𝐞 -1.114 0.213 0.000 
𝐄𝐱𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐞𝐑𝐚𝐭𝐞𝒕−𝟏 1.093 0.213 0.000 
𝐄𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐨𝐫 0.008 0.004 0.068 
𝐆𝐃𝐏 -9.38e-07 3.27e-07 0.004 












Table D.3: Results of the estimation of BPI model 
Model 3 – BPI    
Variables Estimates Standard 
deviation 
P-Value 
𝐁𝐏𝐈𝒕−𝟏 0.999 0.002 0.000 
𝐁𝐄𝐒 0.029 0.006 0.000 
𝐁𝐄𝐒𝒕−𝟏 -0.029 0.006 0.000 
𝐁𝐂𝐏 0.089 0.005 0.000 
𝐁𝐂𝐏𝒕−𝟏 -0.089 0.005 0.000 
𝐄𝐱𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐞𝐑𝐚𝐭𝐞 -1.196 0.066 0.003 
𝐄𝐱𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐞𝐑𝐚𝐭𝐞𝒕−𝟏 0.206 0.065 0.002 
𝐄𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐨𝐫 -0.002 0.001 0.053 
𝐃𝐔𝐌𝐌𝐘 -0.234 0.043 0.000 
𝐃𝐔𝐌𝐌𝐘𝒕−𝟏 0.247 0.045 0.000 
𝐆𝐃𝐏 -3.29e-08 1.01e-07 0.744 











Table D.4: Results of the estimation of Mota-Engil model 
Model 4 – Mota-Engil    
Variables Estimates Standard 
deviation 
P-Value 
𝐌𝐨𝐭𝐚 − 𝐄𝐧𝐠𝐢𝐥𝒕−𝟏 0.997 0.001 0.000 
𝐁𝐄𝐒 0.054 0.010 0.000 
𝐁𝐄𝐒𝒕−𝟏 -0.055 0.010 0.000 
𝐁𝐂𝐏 0.085 0.008 0.000 
𝐁𝐂𝐏𝒕−𝟏 -0.085 0.008 0.000 
𝐁𝐏𝐈 0.328 0.028 0.000 
𝐁𝐏𝐈𝒕−𝟏 -0.321 0.028 0.000 
𝐃𝐔𝐌𝐌𝐘 -1.021 0.069 0.000 
𝐃𝐔𝐌𝐌𝐘𝒕−𝟏 1.058 0.071 0.000 












Table D.5: Results of the estimation of EDP model 
Model 5 – EDP    
Variables Estimates Standard 
deviation 
P-Value 
𝐄𝐃𝐏𝒕−𝟏 0.996 0.001 0.000 
𝐁𝐄𝐒 0.015 0.006 0.015 
𝐁𝐄𝐒𝒕−𝟏 -0.016 0.006 0.011 
𝐁𝐂𝐏 0.056 0.005 0.000 
𝐁𝐂𝐏𝒕−𝟏 -0.056 0.005 0.000 
𝐁𝐏𝐈 0.208 0.017 0.000 
𝐁𝐏𝐈𝒕−𝟏 -0.204 0.017 0.000 
𝐃𝐔𝐌𝐌𝐘 -0.389 0.042 0.000 
𝐃𝐔𝐌𝐌𝐘𝒕−𝟏 0.393 0.043 0.000 












Table D.6: Results of the estimation of NOS model 
Model 6 – NOS    
Variables Estimates Standard 
deviation 
P-Value 
𝐍𝐎𝐒𝒕−𝟏 0.994 0.002 0.000 
𝐁𝐄𝐒 0.071 0.016 0.000 
𝐁𝐄𝐒𝒕−𝟏 -0.067 0.016 0.000 
𝐁𝐂𝐏 0.106 0.013 0.000 
𝐁𝐂𝐏𝒕−𝟏 -0.108 0.013 0.000 
𝐁𝐏𝐈 0.505 0.044 0.000 
𝐁𝐏𝐈𝒕−𝟏 -0.499 0.044 0.000 
𝐃𝐔𝐌𝐌𝐘 -0.301 0.109 0.006 
𝐃𝐔𝐌𝐌𝐘𝒕−𝟏 0.344 0.112 0.002 











Table D.7: Results of the estimation of The Navigator model 
Model 7 – The Navigator    
Variables Estimates Standard 
deviation 
P-Value 
𝐓𝐡𝐞𝐍𝐚𝐯𝐢𝐠𝐚𝐭𝐨𝐫𝒕−𝟏 0.996 0.002 0.000 
𝐁𝐄𝐒 0.012 0.004 0.010 
𝐁𝐄𝐒𝒕−𝟏 -0.013 0.004 0.005 
𝐁𝐂𝐏 0.039 0.004 0.000 
𝐁𝐂𝐏𝒕−𝟏 -0.039 0.004 0.000 
𝐁𝐏𝐈 0.150 0.012 0.000 
𝐁𝐏𝐈𝒕−𝟏 -0.147 0.012 0.000 
𝐃𝐔𝐌𝐌𝐘 -0.117 0.030 0.000 
𝐃𝐔𝐌𝐌𝐘𝒕−𝟏 0.106 0.031 0.001 













The model 1 corresponds to the best performance, that is, 99.93% of the 
dependent variable is explained by the model regressors, although the three first 
models, for BES (Table D.1), BCP (Table D.2) and BPI (Table D.3) have very similar 
determination coefficients. Concerning the final four models, Mota-Engil (Table D.4), 
EDP (Table D.5) and NOS (Table D.6) the best performance is for 99.86% from NOS 
model. 
As mentioned above, Table D.1 presents the results of the model estimates 
which intends to explain the evolution of BES stock prices. The results of Wald`s test 
indicate that only the 6-month euribor rates are not statistically significant for the first 
model, meaning that all the other dependent variables revealed explanatory power 
about BES stock prices behavior. 
Financially, 𝐵𝐸𝑆𝑡−1 , 𝐵𝐶𝑃𝑡 , 𝐵𝑃𝐼𝑡 , 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡  and 𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1  positively affect the 
dependent variable (BES stock price). Contrarily, 𝐵𝐶𝑃𝑡−1, 𝐵𝑃𝐼𝑡−1, 𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡  
negatively influence BES stock price at period 𝑡. 
For the BCP stock price model, represented in the table D.2, the results of Wald`s 
test suggest that also only 6-month Euribor rates are not statistically significant for this 
second model, meaning that all the other dependent variables revealed explanatory 
power about the progress of BCP stock prices. 
Financially, 𝐵𝐶𝑃𝑡−1 , 𝐵𝐸𝑆𝑡 ,  𝐵𝑃𝐼𝑡 , 𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1 , 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡  affect positively the 
dependent variable (BCP stock prices). However, 𝐵𝐸𝑆𝑡−1, 𝐵𝑃𝐼𝑡−1, 𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡  
affect negatively BCP stock prices. 
As represented in table D.3, for BPI stock prices model the results of Wald`s test 
stress that only the 6-month Euribor rates and GDP are not statistically significant, 
meaning all the remaining variables have explanatory power about the progress of BPI 
stock prices. 
Financially, 𝐵𝑃𝐼𝑡−1, 𝐵𝐸𝑆𝑡, 𝐵𝐶𝑃𝑡 , 𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1 and 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑡−1 positively affect the 
dependent variable (BPI stock price). Contrarily,  𝐵𝐸𝑆𝑡−1 , 𝐵𝐶𝑃𝑡−1 , 𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 , 
𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡  , 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑡  and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡  negatively influence BES stock price at period 𝑡. 
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In what concerns the dummy variable, as it was mentioned before, it assumes 
the value 1 after the BES bankruptcy, being its coefficient  𝛽10 = −0.234 (Table D.3) , it 
influences negatively BPI stock prices, ceteris paribus. This means that, it increases 
systemic risk by 0.234 units. 
We have also seen that if we add the same dummy variable in BCP stock prices 
model the 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑡  is not statistically significant, meaning that the bankruptcy of “Banco 
Espírito Santo” did not affect BCP stock prices in such a significant way as it affected BPI 
stock prices. 
Tables D.4, D.5, D.6 and D.7 present the results of the model estimates which 
intends to explain the evolution of stock prices for non-financial institutions. The results 
of Wald`s test for the four models indicate that all the independent variables, I mean, 
banks´ stock prices revealed explanatory power about the behavior of the dependent 
variables. 
Financially, for these four models (Tables D.4, D.5, D.6 and D.7), 𝐵𝐸𝑆𝑡 , 𝐵𝐶𝑃𝑡 , 𝐵𝑃𝐼𝑡 , 
and 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑡−1  positively affect the dependent variable at period 𝑡. Contrarily, 𝐵𝐸𝑆𝑡−1 , 
𝐵𝐶𝑃𝑡−1, 𝐵𝑃𝐼𝑡−1 and 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑡 negatively influence the dependent variable at period 𝑡. 
In addition, the dummy variable for Mota-Engil model has a coefficient  𝛽8 =
−1.021 , meaning that BES collapse influenced negatively Mota-Engil stock prices, 
increasing systemic risk by 1.021 units. In EDP and NOS models the systemic risk increase 
is similar, 0.389 and 0.301, respectively. Finally, in what concerns The Navigator model 
the systemic risk increase was 0.117. 
This analysis came up with a result we still have no answer for, which is the fact 
that banks` or non-financial institutions stock prices time lag impacts negatively on 







Taking into account the undergoing financial situation in Portugal and in many 
other economies resulting from the recent financial crisis which began in 2007, and 
considering the dimension of the negative effects which have surfaced during the recent 
years, I thought it was necessary to find a proxy to evaluate the real impact of systemic 
risk in the financial system and in the Portuguese economy. Therefore the main aim of 
this work was to identify the effects of a financial institution`s bankruptcy in other 
institutions operating in the domestic market. 
The seven models adopted to assess this issue allowed to take important 
conclusions about the relationship between the stock prices of three banks and the 
stock prices of four non-financial institutions considered in this study.  
In fact, when we tried to assess the horizontally systemic risk3, there is a positive 
relationship between BES stock prices and BPI and BCP stock prices when comparing the 
same time period. That is to say that the behavior of BCP and BPI stock prices is similar 
to that behavior of BES stock prices. Moreover, the introduction of a dummy variable in 
such a way that we could distinguish the period before BES bankruptcy and the period 
after BES bankruptcy enabled us to quantify systemic risk in the case of BPI stock prices 
supporting the above statement. 
In respect to the impact of BES bankruptcy in non-financial institutions, that is, 
considering vertically systemic risk, and according to the dummy variable, Mota-Engil 
was the most affected company. This could have arisen for two main reasons. The first 
one is that, as we mentioned previously in the section “2.2. Portugal and the Crisis”, the 
real estate market was largely affected by the instability in the banking sector, and as 
consequence it also impacted the construction sector. On the other hand, construction 
companies largely depend on financing and on public and private entities investment 
what can justify a negative effect on Mota-Engil stock prices. 
If we consider the contagion effect4 as a mechanism of systemic risk, we can 
conclude that NOS stock prices were the most affected by this phenomenon, as they are 
 
3 As mentioned in section “1.1 Systemic Risk”, the horizontal approach is limited to events in the 
financial system. 
4 The higher or lower interconnection between those institutions will determine the transmission of 
shocks through different channels that will cause the contagion effect. 
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highly correlated with BPI and BES stock prices, meaning that they are interconnected. 
So, we can say that a crisis of confidence may lead to uncertainty in the real economy 
and not only in the financial institutions. 
The economic adjustment program in Portugal brought serious repercussions in 
the short term, exacerbating the effects of the recession in the real economy. However, 
it is important to underline the beneficial results of the economic adjustment program 
in the long term. It was due to the economic adjustment program that a public finances 
recovery took place, the financial sector stabilised and it brought the economy back on 
a path of recovery. Adding to this, it allowed for a substantial improvement in the 
nominal and structural government deficit. And important steps have also been taken 
in the banking sector, namely the reinforcement in capitalization of the banks and 
improvements in banking supervision. 
Nonetheless, this study allows us to conclude that the bankruptcy of a bank can 
impact negatively other institutions in the same domestic market, because they are 
positively correlated. A distress event in one financial institution can create instability in 
other financial and non-financial institutions. 
We should bear in mind the existence of the economic cycles and the 
interconnection of the economies in different countries and as Lourtie (23) notes, “One 
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A. Description and Descriptive Statistics 
A.1. Variables description 
Table A.1: Variables Description 
Variable Code Description  
BES Share price of BES bank on a daily basis  
BPI Share price of BPI bank on a daily basis  
BCP Share price of BCP bank on a daily basis  
Mota-Engil Share price of Mota-Engil company on a daily basis  
EDP Share price of EDP company on a daily basis  
NOS Share price of NOS company on a daily basis  
The Navigator Share price of The Navigator company on a daily basis  
Exchange Rate EUR/USD  
Euribor Euro Interbank Offer Rate based on 6 months interest rates on 
an annual basis 
 
GDP Portuguese Gross Domestic Product on an annual basis  
 
A.2. Variables Descriptive Statistics  
Table A.2: Variables descriptive statistics 
Variables Observations Average Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
BES 3281 7.519 4.503 0.12 17.87 
BPI 3281 2.343 1.373 0.339 5.854 
BCP 3281 6.957 4.928 0.398 19.738 
Mota-Engil 3281 2.686 1.572 0.940 8.100 
EDP 3281 2.665 0.712 1.325 4.910 
NOS 3281 6.140 2.903 1.779 12.633 
The Navigator 3281 1.895 0.568 0.870 3.762 
Exchange Rate  3281 1.596 0.183 1.164 2.074 
Euribor 3281 2.569 1.321 0.32 4.83 
GDP 3281 1600364.7 16860.16 128466.3 179929.8 
Souce: PORDATA, Investing.com & Bolsa PT 
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B. Descriptive Figures 
 
Figure B.3: Exchange Rate 
 
Souce: PORDATA 




















































































































































































































































































































Figure B.5: Portuguese gross domestic product 
 
Souce: PORDATA 
C. Test for unit root 
Table C.1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root for BPI 
BPI lag(3) - Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root   
Critical Values t-Statistic Prob 
1% Level -2.566  
5% Level -1.941  
10% Level -1.617  
ADF test statistic – BPI -29.637 0.0000 
 
Table C.2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root for BES 
BES lag(3) - Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root   
Critical Values t-Statistic Prob 
1% Level -2.566  
5% Level -1.941  
10% Level -1.617  






















































































































































Table C.3: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root for BCP 
BCP lag(3) - Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root   
Critical Values t-Statistic Prob 
1% Level -2.566  
5% Level -1.941  
10% Level -1.617  
ADF test statistic -27.548 0.0000 
 
Table C.4: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root for Mota-Engil 
Mota-Engil lag(3) - Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for 
unit root 
  
Critical Values t-Statistic Prob 
1% Level -2.566  
5% Level -1.941  
10% Level -1.617  
ADF test statistic -28.503 0.0000 
Table C.5: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root for EDP 
EDP lag(3) - Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root   
Critical Values t-Statistic Prob 
1% Level -2.566  
5% Level -1.941  
10% Level -1.617  
ADF test statistic -29.713 0.0000 
 
Table C.6: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root for NOS 
NOS lag(3) - Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root   
Critical Values t-Statistic Prob 
1% Level -2.566  
5% Level -1.941  
10% Level -1.617  
ADF test statistic -26.988 0.0000 
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Table C.7: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root for The Navigator 
The Navigator lag(3) - Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root  
Critical Values t-Statistic Prob 
1% Level -2.566  
5% Level -1.941  
10% Level -1.617  
ADF test statistic -29.376 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
